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I. INTRODUCTION
Several global problems of extremes have raised fundamental questions
about the viability of American capitalism and about the legal regime
enabling it to exist and thrive—the American property system. One
problem concerns the troubling and growing concentration of wealth in
the hands of a few. This problem of extreme wealth exists not only in the
United States but also at the global level, both within and between
developed and developing countries. In the United States, for example,
the 400 richest Americans saw their wealth triple or quadruple in size
since the 1980s yet represent only .00025% of the country’s population.1
*
© 2021 Lynda L. Butler. All rights reserved. Chancellor Professor of Law and
Director, Property Rights Project, William & Mary Law School. B.S. William & Mary;
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1. See Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 119
fig.1, 123 fig.3 (2019). Zucman defines wealth as all financial and non-financial assets
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The 150 million adults in the bottom 60%, in contrast, experienced a
decrease in wealth from 1987 (5.7%) to 2014 (2.1%) and collectively
owned less than the 400 richest Americans. 2 A number of studies of
different data sources have confirmed this trend of a sharp increase in the
wealth share of the top 1% of Americans.3 Though wealth distribution in
other countries is more varied, many nations also have experienced significant
concentrations of wealth.4 In Russia, for instance, the transition from
communism to capitalism resulted in an extremely high wealth concentration.5
One important consequence of this problem of extreme wealth is the
consolidation of political influence in the hands of a few, who can more
easily fund their candidates and causes.6
A second related problem of extremes concerns the widening gap
between high-income and low-income classes, aggravated by an increase
in the low-income classes.7 As lower income people lose their ability to
earn and to accumulate wealth, they become more vulnerable to economic
downturns and less able to climb up the income ladder or out of poverty.8
This decline is due in part to the 2008 financial crisis, which devalued the
main form of wealth of middle- and low-income people—their home.9
The bigger the gap becomes, the more the sense of injustice and outrage
grows, producing calls for change. In the United States, those calls have
“over which households can enforce ownership rights and that provide economic benefits to
their owners, net of any debts.” Id. at 112. Gabriel Zucman has been described as “America’s
top wealth detective.” Ben Steverman, The Wealth Detective Who Finds the Hidden
Money of the Super Rich, BLOOMBERG B USINESSWEEK (May 23, 2019, 2:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-05-23/the-wealth-detective-who-findsthe-hidden-money-of-the-super-rich [https://perma.cc/3RP8-8KYW]. For an introduction to
the disagreement among economists on the extent of the inequality problem, see Economists Are
Rethinking the Numbers on Inequality, ECONOMIST (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.economist.
com/briefing/2019/11/28/economists-are-rethinking-the-numbers-on-inequality [https://
perma.cc/K3NR-MAPE].
2. Christopher Ingraham, Wealth Concentration Returning to ‘Levels Last Seen
During the Roaring Twenties,’ According to New Research, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2019,
9:12 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/08/wealth-concentrationreturning-levels-last-seen-during-roaring-twenties-according-new-research/?noredirect=
on&utm_term=.844162deb303 [https://perma.cc/2H53-UU3M]; USA, WORLD INEQUALITY
DATABASE, https://wid.world/country/usa/ [https://perma.cc/8CRA-6XKY].
3. See Zucman, supra note 1, at 110–11.
4. See id. at 111.
5. Id.
6. Ingraham, supra note 2.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CHRONICLES ON OUR TROUBLED TIMES 1–2 (Seth
Ackerman trans., 2016); see also David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,
610 A NNALS AM . A CAD . P OL . & S OC . S CI . 22, 22–24, 29–32 (2007) (asserting that
neoliberalism is restoring power and dominance to the wealthy class that lost power to
social democracy movements).

74

BUTLER_58-1_POST BUTLER PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 73, 2021]

3/22/2021 3:16 PM

Viewing Property as a System
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

included such wealth redistribution devices as an increase in the minimum
wage,10 Medicare for All,11 a more progressive tax code, and a millionaire’s
tax.12 Unless changes occur, the gap could continue to widen to a point
that would threaten social and political cohesion.
In addition to these problems of extreme wealth and extreme poverty,
the United States and the world are facing potentially catastrophic
environmental harm resulting from climate change.13 An overwhelming
percentage of the world’s climate scientists agree that greenhouse gas
emissions must be reduced significantly—and soon—in order to avoid
reaching a tipping point, where the Earth’s climate system moves to a new
state that will be much less hospitable to life as we know it.14 Warming
10. See Heather Boushey, Understanding How Raising the Federal Minimum Wage
Affects Income Inequality and Economic Growth, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://equitablegrowth.org/understanding-the-minimum-wage-andincome-inequality-and-economic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/FD6S-HGRH].
11. Health Care as a Human Right – Medicare for All, BERNIE S ANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/NT73-4NA9]; Jeff
Stein, Sen. Kamala Harris’s 2020 Policy Agenda: $3 Trillion Tax Plan, Tax Credits for
Renters, Bail Reform, Medicare for All, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019, 8:40 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/21/sen-kamala-harriss-policy-agenda-trilliontax-plan-tax-credits-renters-bail-reform-medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/Q369-UUWZ].
12. See Liz Goodwin, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Wealth Tax and Lays Down
2020 Marker, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2019, 8:57 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/
politics/2019/01/24/elizabeth-warren-will-propose-wealth-tax-very-rich/9PYJIr0xLrdSjv
XX7h0szM/story.html [https://perma.cc/KKA6-JDCA]; Stein, supra note 11; Robert Reich,
Why We Need a Wealth Tax, ROBERT REICH (May 14, 2019), https://robertreich.org/post/
184864571375 [https://perma.cc/M88W-TNT6].
13. See Stephen Leahy, Climate Study Warns of Vanishing Safety Window–Here’s
Why, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/
%202019/03/%20climate-change-model-warns-of-difficult-future/ [https://perma.cc/
DN7S-S8VM].
14.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 4 (2015), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_
FINAL_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y666-CVZW]; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH.
PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 14, 35 (2017), https://science2017.global
change.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP6U-U39B] [hereinafter
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT]; Leahy, supra note 13. The National Climate Assessment
released in November 2018 concludes that the dangers posed by climate change are
worsening. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, 2 FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 34–71 (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/1/ [https://perma.cc/8ADK-ZUBD]; see also Brady
Dennis & Chris Mooney, Major Trump Administration Climate Report Says Damage Is
‘Intensifying Across the Country,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/11/23/major-trump-administrationclimate-report-says-damages-are-intensifying-across-country/ [https://perma.cc/8RQ5-

75

BUTLER_58-1_POST BUTLER PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/22/2021 3:16 PM

oceans and temperatures lead to more water in the atmosphere, the melting
of land and sea ice, rising sea levels, and more intense weather events in
whatever form they occur.15 Category 5 hurricanes will develop more
quickly and frequently, snowstorms will cover larger areas and produce
greater accumulations, polar air will plunge more deeply, and arid conditions
caused by shifting ocean and atmospheric currents will lead to longer
droughts and more intense wildfires.16
All three problems of extreme are occurring largely unchecked because of
the excesses of the American form of capitalism and the now dominant
economic theory of property that allows capitalism to operate virtually
unconstrained.17 The current American strand of capitalism is a free
market, neoliberal approach that stresses the importance of marketplace
transactions and the decision-making of rational, self-interested actors
who are often free-riding on others.18 The economic theory of property
underlying American and other western-style property systems legitimates
the power of owners to decide, largely on their own, how to use and
manage their property.19 That theory encourages the disaggregation of
resources into increasingly smaller units for the purpose of creating
greater returns, though not necessarily in the form of actual goods and
products.20 Indeed, much of the new wealth is held as finance capital

H7K8]. In December 2019, two experts warned that, because of deforestation and fires,
the Amazon is now facing a tipping point. See Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Top
Scientists Warn of an Amazon ‘Tipping Point,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2019, 3:14 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/top-scientists-warn-of-an-amazontipping-point/2019/12/20/9c9be954-233e-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.html [https://
perma.cc/FUP8-YEPX].
15. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14, at 5–7;
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 231.
16. See CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 231, 277; JOSEPH
ROMM, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 73–74, 80–84, 118–23
(2016). See generally UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WHEN RISING SEAS HIT HOME:
HARD CHOICES AHEAD FOR HUNDREDS OF US COASTAL COMMUNITIES (2017).
17. See STEVEN PEARLSTEIN, CAN AMERICAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? WHY GREED IS
NOT GOOD, OPPORTUNITY IS NOT EQUAL, AND FAIRNESS WON’T MAKE US POOR 33–39
(2018) (discussing how self-interest, rational expectations, and a zealous commitment
to efficient markets hijacked Adam Smith’s economic theory).
18. See Robert Kuttner, Neoliberalism: Political Success, Economic Failure, AM.
PROSPECT (June 25, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/neoliberalism-political-successeconomic-failure/ [https://perma.cc/CC65-DH6P].
19. For a financial expert’s explanation of the relationship between private property and
capitalism, see Sean Ross, How Are Capitalism and Private Property Related?, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/how-are-capitalismand-private-property-related.asp [https://perma.cc/5YZF-GGJJ].
20. See id.
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and, to a lesser extent, as social capital.21 Each smaller property unit, in
turn, includes the gatekeeping or decision-making power accompanying
individual ownership. Because of the focus on the individual decisionmaker and the economic incentives guiding decision-making, the American
systems of property and capitalism have acquired a distinctly predatory
character that, if left unchecked over time, could undermine political and
social cohesion and destroy the integrity of the Earth’s biophysical systems.22
With its focus on individual rights and its exclusion-based perspective,
the American property system is not now set up to encourage an outwardregarding or system-wide view of life. Alternative property arrangements,
like naturally occurring commons and hybrid arrangements having both
private and public property characteristics, tend to be ignored or viewed
with suspicion. Though statutes and regulations could constrain the exercise of
an owner’s decision-making power, significant limitations would be
necessary to address the problems of extremes. These limitations could, in
turn, face challenges, both legal and political,23 including constitutional
claims under the takings clauses of federal and state constitutions. Even
if the challenges ultimately fail, they would slow implementation of
solutions addressing the underlying problems. Further, the underlying
norms of common law property still would not change.
Can—or should—the American property system adapt to curb the excesses
inherent in the dominant form of capitalism? Those extolling the virtues
of privatization of resources would likely answer in the negative. Such a
response would ignore the core functions and infrastructure of the

21. Restrictive covenants facilitate capitalization of social capital by, for example,
promoting and protecting shared interests in certain living arrangements. See JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 222–23, 253 (5th ed. 2017) [hereinafter SINGER, PROPERTY].
Finance capital is created, for instance, by mortgage investment practices. See Joseph
William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 507–12 (2013) (discussing
banking practices in the subprime mortgage market that created finance capital for the
originating lender and serious risk of nonpayment for many others). A new type of
securitization of real estate involves rental payments from single-family homes and
exemplifies the trend toward overreliance on financial asset property. See Faisal Chaudhry,
Property as Rent, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374554 [https://perma.cc/2XQA-T4NM].
22. See Harvey, supra note 9, at 22–23, 33–39.
23. For an example of a legal challenge delaying regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions and the political challenges raised by the intense lobbying efforts of fossil fuel
companies to prevent greenhouse gas emission regulation, see Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007).
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American institution of property. This Article discusses the structure of
property that enables property law to evolve over time, reacting to changing
conditions, recognizing informal customs and usages, and otherwise taking
into account important feedbacks. It explains how property provides an
ordering system of concepts and principles that define and govern relations
between a society and its resources at an individual and collective level.
As an ordering system, property performs the important functions of
allocating, distributing, and managing interests in the society’s resources
according to accepted norms and principles. The in rem nature of property
rights gives holders their power over third parties, while constitutional
provisions protect property owners from government overreach.24 Basic
operating principles and norms then guide the decision-making of the
property owners—the gatekeepers—in ways that again reflect accepted
norms. But when those norms and principles ignore physical realities,
when they clash with other values fundamental to the political structure of
the society, when they conflict with modern scientific truths and
understandings, it is time for the property system to reevaluate some of its
core operating principles and guiding norms. Such a reform effort, however,
requires a deeper understanding of the importance of viewing property as
a system.
II. PROPERTY AS AN ORDERING SYSTEM
A search for property’s hidden structure requires understanding how
property is an ordering system. Private property orders daily life in ways that
promote economic activities while protecting individual liberty and
autonomy. Property promotes economic activity through its delegation of
power and its incentive structure.25 By a simple delegation of decisionmaking authority, property law gives the owner of a resource the power
to decide how and when to hold, use, transfer, and care for the resource.
The owner’s individual preferences are shaped by property’s internal
incentives, which are tied to a particular society’s political and social
values. Under the American system, the scale of decision-making traditionally
has focused on the owner’s personal interests and the boundaries of the
particular property,26 even though the impacts of the use may have a
24. For a private property advocate’s perspective on the relationship between private
property rights and the Constitution, see Roger Pilon, Property Rights and the Constitution, in
CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 173, 173–90 (8th ed. 2017), https://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-forpolicymakers-8th-edition-16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS4J-BNSM].
25. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1165–69 (1999).
26. Id.
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much greater footprint.27 The information costs of property owners are
controlled by core operating principles that limit the flow of information.
The numerus clausus principle, for example, restricts the types and
categories of property interests allowed, thus controlling the options and
information that prospective property owners must consider.28 Easement
law also controls information that property owners should weigh in
deciding whether to grant an easement in their land by tying the use right
to the physical boundaries of the original benefitted estate and banning
expansion of that land beyond those boundaries.29 Without this ban,
prospective owners of the burdened land would not be able to foresee how
large the benefitted land could become.
In a democratic society, the liberty and autonomy interests of property
owners are protected not only from other members of society but also
from government itself. 30 The Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution prevents the government from taking property for public use
without payment of just compensation, while the Due Process Clause
protects property interests from government deprivation without due process of
law.31 The in rem character of property rights acts as property’s powerbase,
giving possessors rights that are good against the world except for a party
with a superior claim.32 The peaceful possessor typically does not need an
armed force to protect her rights, only strong and independent courts dispersed
among the states and applying the states’ respective property laws.
The in rem nature of property reflects a fundamental distinction between
property and contract rights. Contracts produce interests that are generally
only valid between those at the bargaining table as well as subsequent
parties voluntarily brought into privity of contract.33 Property rights, in
27. If the property is intangible, the boundaries would primarily be legal or
technological.
28. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (discussing the
numerus clausus principle). Estates in land, for instance, only include a limited number
of types and forms. See id. at 12–14.
29. See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
30. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
31. Id.
32. See McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548, 549 (1866); Armory v.
Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664; 1 Strange 505, 505; J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 23, 26–27, 68, 70–71, 75–76 (1997) (discussing the in rem nature of
property rights).
33. See PENNER, supra note 32, at 23.
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contrast, can bind third parties not at the bargaining table and not a successorin-interest simply because of the in rem character of the rights.34 Third
parties normally cannot go onto the land of another without the permission of
the owner—even though the third parties never agreed to the acquisition of
rights by the landowner—because of the owner’s rights, which include the
power to exclude.35 Assuming the relevant statute of limitations has not
run, a subsequent possessor of personal property cannot prevail against a
prior possessor who did not voluntarily relinquish his rights, not even
when the prior possessor’s rights are based on finding the property.36 As
against the subsequent possessor, the prior possession is peaceful and
superior.37 Through the in rem character then, a default ordering system
of priorities is established for resolving conflicts.38
Even covenants between the original parties to a transaction can acquire an
in rem character if the covenants meet certain requirements designed to
identify those covenants so closely connected to the use and possession
of the property that they are considered to be part of the ownership
interests.39 In addition to a properly created and qualifying property
relationship, today typically done through a conveyance, common law
property requires that the original parties intend for the covenants to run
with the land and be part of the ownership interests in the land.40 The
covenant also must touch and concern the land, directly affecting use of
the property or directly enhancing or restricting the value of the property.41
These requirements act as sieves to ensure that the wheat is separated from
the chaff, allowing those covenants intended to affect and control the use
of the land to pass through to bind or benefit remote parties subsequently
34. Id.
35. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997)
(protecting the essential right to exclude against an intentional trespass with an award of
punitive damages even though no real damage occurred); see also Adams v. ClevelandCliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 218–19, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing and
deciding to maintain the important differences between trespass actions protecting the
right to exclude and nuisance actions protecting the right of use, reasoning that an owner
should not have to justify exercising the right to exclude).
36. Clark v. Maloney, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 68, 69 (Del. Super. Ct. 1840); Anderson v.
Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892). But if the statute of limitations to recover
possession has run, the subsequent possessor may have acquired a superior interest through
adverse possession. See generally Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 23 F. Supp. 2d
219, 222–23 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
37. Clark, 3 Del. (3. Harr.) at 70.
38. For further examples of how the in rem character shapes operating rules and
manages property rights, see infra notes 41–45, 108–21, and accompanying text.
39. See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of
Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 172–73 (1971).
40. See id. at 178.
41. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 253–55.
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acquiring interests in the tract or in related property—for instance, when
subdivided lots are developed under a common plan. So, for example, a
covenant to refund a security deposit included in the prime lease would
run with the land and bind successor landlords if the security deposit could
only be used to repair the leasehold premises or cover payment of unpaid
rent. But if the security deposit instead was used as a bargaining chip to
induce a party to agree to the lease, the covenant would not have enough
of a tie to the property relationship in the leasehold to warrant being treated
as a covenant running with the land and would instead be an interest that
lies in contract.42 Covenants that meet the tests and pass through property’s
sieves for running with the land help to decrease the costs of property
transactions by eliminating the need for future negotiations.43
Informal arrangements also may lead to recognition of a limited type of
in rem interest and to formalization of internal norms. For example, when
one party induces another to rely and make substantial investments in
property, thinking that the relationship would result in a more permanent use
right, courts have found ways to effectuate the contemplated arrangement.44
If the first party then tries to deny any permanence to the use, the party
who relied might be able to enforce the arrangement in equity as creating a
sort of property interest. In some cases, the interest might even become
transferable, binding a successor-in-interest.45 Such results promote desired
behavioral goals, encouraging cooperation between neighbors or transacting
parties.
Property’s powerbase, internal incentive structure, and information-cost
controls enable it to self-organize and self-regulate. Henry Smith developed
an information cost theory of property that explains property’s structure.46
42. See Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Invs. Co., 691 P.2d 970, 972
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
43. Though covenants also could create legal boundaries for intangible property,
like software, that bind third parties, courts so far have preferred to use contract principles in
those situations. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
44. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111, 135 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Ky. 1976). See generally
JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 32.07 (3d. ed. 2012) (discussing
irrevocable licenses or easements by estoppel).
46. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691,
1693, 1716, 1725 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property as the Law of Things]. Through the
Fourth Restatement of Property project, Smith proposes to capture the architecture of
property, and thus the complexity of the system, by revealing the concepts, principles, and
organization of the system as well as the interactions of the parts and the coherence of the
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Modules established by core concepts organize property’s complex system
by regulating the flow of information to promote efficient transactions and
decision-making.47 Information not relevant to a particular situation is
walled off by the modular structure through property rules and features.48
These modules are based on preset packages of rights that have developed
over time and regulate interactions by limiting portals of entry between
the external world and the property system.49 The modular structure thus
streamlines interactions, limiting choices an interested party may consider.50
Restricting the forms that property interests may take, in turn, promotes
standardization.51 Property’s networks of communication—the marketplace
and the courts—then help property to self-organize and self-regulate in a
social system sense.52 Those networks pass on information shaped by
internal norms and rules through the modules to interested parties.53 The
marketplace serves as the main network for communicating economic
information, while the courts provide the primary means of communicating
legal rules and standards.54 Property thus is the central system in a
democracy for integrating power over resources into daily life through its
structure, norms, and behavioral rules.55
The internal norms and options embedded in property’s decision-making
pathways allow the system to operate with minimal government intervention
by making assumptions about default rules and strategic choices.56 Property,

whole. See Henry E. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, in 10 MODERN S TUDIES
IN PROPERTY LAW 19, 21–26 (Ben McFarlane & Sinead Agnew eds., 2019) [hereinafter Smith,

Restating the Architecture of Property].
47. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, supra note 46, at 21–26.
48. See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1701–02, 1708;
Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 26–38.
49. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1706–10, 1716–18,
1725–26 (describing the “LEGO-like interface” of property forms). For a discussion of
the dialectical processes involved in the evolution of property interests and principles, see
Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 899–908 (2013)
[hereinafter Butler, Resilience of Property].
50. See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 46, at 1707–08, 1711–12,
1720–21, 1725–26.
51. Id. at 1707–08, 1710–13.
52. Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
1215, 1242 (2017) [hereinafter Butler, Property as Management].
53. See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 886–90; Butler, Property
as Management, supra note 52, at 1242.
54. See FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER LUIGI LUISI, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE: A
UNIFYING VISION 308–14 (2014) (discussing the networks of communication, origins of
power, and types of structures in social systems).
55. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1242.
56. See Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 239, 241–48 (2012); David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property
Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development, ACCT., ECON. & L., Jan. 2011, at 1, 4
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for example, assumes that a tenant, as possessor of the leasehold premises,
bears the risks of gains and losses associated with the exercise of possessory
rights.57 More generally, property assumes that people are rational actors and
prefer more rather than less wealth, and that private rights are generally
superior to public or common rights.58 These preferences are shaped and
reinforced by the American legal system’s strong tradition of individual
rights and the dominant economic theory now justifying private property
rights.59 Over time, however, the embedded options and norms lose their
connection to the original defining context and acquire a significance of
their own, framing choices and obscuring the underlying meaning.60 As
the connection to context is lost, the norms and options speak for themselves,
driving behavioral patterns even when physical realities and knowledge
have changed.61 The constitutional protections accorded property rights then
build in a rigidity and inertia that make necessary change very difficult to
achieve.62 Though it is possible to alter the pathways of embedded options
once feedbacks are detected, the problem of rigidity, created in part by
constitutional protection of economic expectations, raises serious obstacles.63

(2011). For an examination of how scripts or embedded options guide decision-making
and can increase transaction costs, see Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting
the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863, 884–89, 896–908 (2010). See generally IAN
AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. McEnany, 48 N.E. 781, 781 (Mass. 1897); Paradine v. Jane
(1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 898; Aleyn, 27, 28.
58. See Kennedy, supra note 56, at 2–9 (introducing the argument that strong property
rights are linked to economic growth). For an explanation of the assumptions and conditions
underlying Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand and how the power of a strong
legal regime dislodges capital from those assumptions and conditions, see KATHARINA
PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 1–15
(2019).
59. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 537 (1989) (discussing the federalists’ efforts to protect individual rights through the
Contracts and Taking Clauses); Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1223–
50 (discussing property’s management role).
60. Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 886; see Kennedy, supra note
56, at 5; Macey, supra note 56, at 905.
61. Macey, supra note 56, at 903–06.
62. Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 888.
63. Id. at 889.
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III. PROPERTY’S FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS
Property’s self-organizing and self-regulating features enable the system
to serve three important functions: allocating rights and interests in a
society’s resources; distributing those rights and interests consistent with
the society’s fundamental political and social norms; and managing the
rights and interests effectively and fairly to resolve and minimize conflicts.
The primary norm guiding the allocation function is efficiency. Under the
neoliberal economic theory of property, the norm of efficiency promotes selfinterested decision-making and encourages maximization of individual
welfare, with little if any consideration given to third party, public, or other
external interests.64 The false equivalency of social welfare with individual
welfare, in particular, has led the property system to ignore important public
and noneconomic interests, especially in shared resources.65 Equating
individual self-interest with social welfare made sense when Adam Smith
first developed his “invisible hand” theory of the market.66 As Smith
explained, allowing individuals to pursue their self-interests promoted
social welfare because each individual “endeavours to employ his capital
as near home as he can, and consequently” to the benefit of the local
economy.67 The individual “know[s] better the character and situation of
the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he
knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress.”68
Further, individuals pursuing their own self-interests would rationally
choose the option yielding the greatest value to themselves and therefore
are “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
[their] intention.”69
This reasoning, however, ignores current changes in the market and in
the natural and legal systems that have affected the conditions required
for Smith’s invisible hand to work.70 Those changes include the rise of a
global market that is now “only loosely tied to specific states.”71 The rise
is due in large part to the removal by nation-states of legal barriers to entry
and the states’ recognition of the applicability of foreign laws.72 The

64.
65.
66.

See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1258–59.
See id.
See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 178–81 (9th ed. 1799).
67. Id. at 178.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 181.
70. PISTOR, supra note 58, at 6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.

84

BUTLER_58-1_POST BUTLER PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 73, 2021]

3/22/2021 3:16 PM

Viewing Property as a System
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

building blocks of capital, in other words, have now been “[d]islodg[ed] . . .
from the legal systems that begot them.”73
Smith used the conditions of his time to develop his concept of the
invisible hand. Today we must do the same and update our understanding
of how nature, property law, and the market interact. In particular,
western-style societies must recognize that the operation of the invisible
hand depends on the character and quality of the legal rules at play.74
Once economic actors acquired the ability to choose their legal regime
without moving assets, people, or legal entities, they became able to opt
in or out of different regimes in varying business contexts, depending on
their individual interests, without regard for a particular state’s social
welfare.75 The failure to recognize the conditions required for Smith’s
invisible hand to work well has led to serious problems of extremes.76
Lacking appropriate considerations of scale, the efficiency norm drives
the behavior of property owners in a predatory direction, promoting a
concentration of wealth and an unrelenting exploitation of natural resources
at significant social and environmental costs.77 The assumptions underlying
the economic theory of property have not been checked regularly for
accuracy, despite important changes in socio-ecological systems and in
scientific understandings.
One example of property’s predatory predisposition can be found in
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.78 In Fontainebleau
the owner of valuable oceanfront property planned to build in a way that
intentionally blocked the sun from reaching the neighboring hotel’s pool
area for much of the day.79 The owner of the neighboring hotel sought
to enjoin the construction, arguing that it would cast such a large shadow
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7–8.
76. See Lynda L. Butler, Property’s Problem with Extremes, 55 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 14–15, 17–20 (2020).
77. See Butler, Property as Management, supra note 52, at 1264 (discussing property’s
problem of scale). For an example of the unrelenting exploitation of natural resources, see
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 2109, 2110–11 (2005) (discussing Coca-Cola’s exploitation of groundwater in India
to the point of causing water shortages); Gayatri Raghunandan, A Look at the Legal
Issues Plachimada’s Struggle for Water Against Coca-Cola Has Brought Up, WIRE
(Aug. 20, 2017), https://thewire.in/law/coca-cola-plachimada-kerala-water [https://perma.cc/
KH8M-UNGX].
78. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
79. Id. at 358.
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that the beach and pool area would be unfit for its guests.80 The Florida
court rejected the claim, agreeing with other American jurisdictions
that the English doctrine of ancient lights did not apply and therefore the
complaining landowner could not acquire a right to the unobstructed flow
of air and sunlight by implication or prescription.81 Yet if the same
landowner owned both hotel properties, the landowner would have found
a way to maximize use of the two properties—perhaps by sharing an expanded
pool and spa facility—and might even have supported the enactment
of a shadow ordinance to govern building construction along the valuable
beachfront. Incorporating a stronger norm of cooperation into the obligation
of neighboring landowners would have better mirrored the result that a
single landowner would have achieved. It also would have imposed
a constraint on malicious and willful conduct taken to interfere with the
beneficial use of neighboring property, especially with a landowner’s
right to a reasonable expectation of gain.82 Malicious interference, in other
words, could have been curbed without recognizing a right to receive
sunlight by prescription or by implication.
Another example involves the construction of very tall condominium
buildings along Central Park in New York City.83 These buildings have
or will produce shadows that extend for three-fourths of a mile and last
for hours, significantly reducing temperatures and harming vegetation in
the Park.84 The buildings are benefitting from an important public resource—
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 359–60; see THOMAS W. M ERRILL & H ENRY E. S MITH , P ROPERTY :
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1020–21 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the doctrine of ancient lights
followed by English courts and uniformly rejected by American jurisdictions). With
its smaller land area, English courts were more concerned about the quality of life in urban
areas, and taller buildings would mean less light. See Evan Nicole Brown, In England,
the Right to Daylight Can Be a Legal Matter, ATLAS OBSCURA (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/right-to-light-law [https://perma.cc/8C4R-E6TW].
The United States, in contrast, was a much larger country, so common law property focused on
promoting development. See id.
82. For cases recognizing a property owner’s nonpossessory right to a reasonable
expectation of gain from the owner’s property, see Keeble v. Hickeringill (1707) 103 Eng.
Rep. 1127, 1127–28; 11 East 573. 574–76; Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 240 (1918).
83. See Jenna McKnight, Wave of Super-Tall Towers in Manhattan Sparks Protests
Over Shadows, DEZEEN (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/11/supertallskinny-skyscrapers-towers-manhattan-new-york-shop-architects-robert-stern-rafaelyvinoly-jean-nouvel-portzamparc-controversy-protest/ [https://perma.cc/KU2S-3VG8].
84. See id.; Emily Nonko, The Super-Tall Towers Transforming NYC’s Skyline,
N.Y. POST (Jan. 23, 2019, 7:44 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/01/23/the-super-tall-towerstransforming-nycs-skyline/ [https://perma.cc/P9CE-K2BD]. The author and urban activist
Jane Jacobs described the shadows from the super tall towers as “a great eraser of human
beings.” JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 106 (1961); see
also Matthew Haag, How Luxury Developers Use a Loophole to Build Soaring Towers for
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Central Park—without accounting for the interference with the public’s
enjoyment of the Park or for the long-term harm to the Park’s ecosystems.85
A twenty-degree drop in temperature on a cold windy day matters. The
developers of these condominium projects benefit by the substantial
increase in price they can charge for selling units that offer an unrestricted
view of Central Park. One buyer paid more than $238 million for a 24,000
square-foot unit, while two units in another skyscraper project sold for
$100.5 and $91.5 million, respectively.86 One building, Central Park Tower,
will be one of the tallest residential skyscrapers in the world, rising 1,550
feet.87 By 2022, thirteen skyscrapers will tower over the south end of
Central Park, creating a “striped” look when the sun shines on that area of
the Park.88 Surely, common law courts could, in a public nuisance action,
force developers to consider serious adverse impacts when they are planning
to exploit the value of a public resource in harmful ways.
A predatory approach also can be seen in the practices of the owners of
coal mines in Pennsylvania.89 Because Pennsylvania law recognized three
separate estates in a tract of land—the surface, mineral, and support
estates90—the owners of coal mines could sell just the surface estate,
reserving the other two estates, and still have the power to mine to the
point of the collapse of the surface estate. An early legislative effort to
protect surface estates from subsidence faced a successful constitutional
challenge brought by the owner of a coal mine.91 In Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court recognized, for the
the Ultrarich in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/
20/nyregion/tallest-buildings-manhattan-loophole.html [https://perma.cc/Z63A-VUQ9].
85. Christopher Tramutola, New York: A Dark Cloud Over City Parks, TOPOS (Sept. 5,
2014), https://www.toposmagazine.com/new-york-dark-cloud-city-parks/ [https://perma.cc/
Q8H8-JWAJ].
86. See Nonko, supra note 84. Sales of the high-priced luxury units have slowed
considerably. See Derek Thompson, Why Manhattan’s Skyscrapers Are Empty, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/american-housing-hasgone-insane/605005/ [https://perma.cc/SGU4-HFCE].
87. Amy Dobson, Tallest Residential Building in the World Reveals New Details–
Including 100th-Floor Amenity Level Overlooking New York City, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2020,
12:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amydobson/2020/01/24/tallest-residential- buildi
ng-in-the-world-reveals-new-detailsincluding-100th-floor-amenity-level-overlooking-newyork-city/#87e919d299c1 [https://perma.cc/S5PC-NNRY].
88. Nonko, supra note 84; McKnight, supra note 83.
89. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (1984).
90. Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 234–35 (Pa. 1943).
91. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
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first time, that a regulation could go too far, creating a situation functionally
equivalent to physical confiscation.92 In Mahon, the Court concluded that
a law causing the loss of all commercially practicable use of the remaining
mineral estate presented such a situation.93 Years later, the Court finally
stopped this harmful mining practice when a coal company challenged a
similar statute.94 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,
the Court upheld the law without directly reversing Mahon.95 The Court
reasoned that the coal left in place only represented 2% of the coal as a
whole and that the support estate really had no meaning or value other
than in relation to the surface or mineral estate.96
In some jurisdictions that recognize only two estates—the mineral and
the surface estates—a presumption of dominance instead is made in favor
of the holder of the mineral estate when that interest has been severed from
the surface estate.97 The holder of the mineral estate, in effect, is viewed as
having an implied easement of surface use.98 This presumption of dominance
serves the same purpose as the three-estate system, imposing much of the
risk of loss or damage on the owner of the surface estate. Though both
practices shape the expectations of the mineral estate holders, ordinary
buyers of surface estates might not foresee or expect that their surface
estate could face subsidence or limitations of such magnitude that they
could not effectively use the land. If the goal is to allow mining that eventually
could damage or significantly restrict the surface estate, then surely a more
transparent and equitable approach exists. Couldn’t, for example, the company
lease, instead of sell, the surface estate under terms that would end the lease
after a set period of time chosen because it reflects when the coal company’s
experts predict the surface estate is expected to collapse or otherwise
suffer serious limitations? This approach would shape the reasonable
expectations of the holders of the mineral and the surface estates in a more
transparent and fair way.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 412–13, 416.
94. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 498, 500–01. The Court defined the denominator for measuring economic
loss to be the property as a whole, refusing to interpret Mahon as requiring the Court to
focus on each pillar of coal. Id. at 497–98.
97. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971); Prop. Owners of
Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
98. See Jones v. Getty Oil Co., 458 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), aff’d,
470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971). See generally JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (6th ed. 2014) (stating that if the mineral estate is severed from the surface
estate, the surface owner’s rights are subject to the mineral owner’s usage of the surface
to reasonably produce minerals).
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The distribution and management functions of property can provide
checks on the destructive tendencies of the neoliberal efficiency norm.
Traits critical to a resilient property system—one that promotes system
integrity—include: the capacity to interact with ecological and other systems
to monitor feedbacks and identify problems; the ability to adapt through
self-organization and self-regulation; and the power to respond by absorbing
change and persisting, without becoming unstable.99 To nurture these traits,
the property system must recognize the need for flexibility, inclusiveness,
and innovation, as well as a diversity of property arrangements and a
redundancy of functions.100 To date, however, the American property system
primarily focuses on promoting the efficient allocation of interests to private
parties.101 This approach made sense when the property system first
developed in America; land and water resources were abundant, wildlife
filled the airs, lands, and waters, and the settlers’ primary goal was survival.102
Times have changed, however, with the limits of natural resources now
understood and the costs of unconstrained land development well
documented.103 Despite new physical realities and scientific understandings,
business continues as usual, assuming away real costs in the name of
efficiency and individual property rights.
The management function of property, in particular, can help to ensure
that the property system is resilient enough to handle change, whether
gradual or sudden, foreseeable or unexpected.104 Because the property
regime links ecological and social systems in ways that can have longstanding
impacts, the approach of property to managing rights and interests is critical
to the integrity of socio-ecological systems. Dealing with problems of
extremes will require significant reforms, so it would be easy to doubt the
role that the property system could play in helping to solve the problems.
After all, common law property is set up to handle incremental change,105
not the type of comprehensive or sudden change that might be needed to
combat extreme problems. Yet if changes in internal norms and assumptions
of common law property are made, those reforms will guide all individual
property owners to make more sustainable management decisions and
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Butler, Resilience of Property, supra note 49, at 894–95.
Id.
See id. at 879.
See id. at 906.
Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 891–92 (discussing resilience in the context of ecosystems).
See id. at 900–03.
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would have, in the aggregate, a much greater impact. Further, without
changes to the norms and operating principles of property, externally
imposed reforms would meet resistance and pushback, and the reasonable
expectations of property owners would not shift in a more sustainable
direction. Historically, property has adapted in part through its tolerance
for informal customs and practices, which have made the system more
inclusive and allowed experimentation to occur, at the fringe, without formal
recognition.106 These experiments have provided important information
about pressure points in the formal system and readied the system for more
significant reform.107
Once reasonable expectations of property owners are reshaped through
the management function to consider external interests affected by a property
owner’s choices, the distribution function then can act more effectively as
a safety valve to ensure fairness on an individual basis while also avoiding
moral outrage and instability on a system-wide basis. Such outrage and
instability are likely to result when the integrity of political, social, and
biophysical systems is seriously threatened by out-of-date rules and principles.
One example of the distribution function working to avoid system instability
occurred in landlord/tenant law in the twentieth century. Legal principles
governing residential leases had not kept up with changes in building
construction and mechanical systems, nor with the plight of urban tenants
who no longer used their home to make a living or raise food for survival.108
Yet, until the 1970s, residential tenants still assumed the risk of living
in uninhabitable premises.109 The courts typically explained that tenants
had the duty to inspect the premises for suitability and, as possessors,
assumed the risk of defects arising later in the lease.110 Some exceptions
were made when the defects caused substantial interference with use and
enjoyment and the tenant could not reasonably be expected to notice the
defects in a timely manner.111 Under those exceptions, though, the tenant’s
remedy was to vacate the premises.112 To make matters worse, tenants

106. See id. at 901.
107. Id. at 898–99.
108. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 476–77.
109. See id.
110. See Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897; Aleyn 27, 27. See generally
Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty Corporation,
in PROPERTY STORIES 123, 127–35 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009)
(discussing landlord/tenant law prior to reform).
111. See Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Mass. 1959).
112. See id. (discussing when a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment could
constitute a constructive eviction). Compare Sutton v. Temple (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1108,
1109; 12 M. & W. 52, 55 (following caveat lessee, which imposes the risk of defects in
the condition of the premises on the tenant unless the parties otherwise agree), with Smith
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who signed a lease with a covenant to repair basically became insurers of
the premises.113
These tensions came to a boil in federal court in the District of Columbia
when the court considered whether to continue to follow the traditional
caveat lessee approach to residential leases for tenants living in urban
slums.114 In Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the
unsanitary conditions facing urban tenants living in housing with over 1,000
code violations.115 Reasoning that the traditional approach promoted neither
the reasonable expectations of urban tenants nor the policies of modern
housing codes, the court concluded that a residential lease in the District
imposed an implied warranty of habitability on the landlord.116 This implied
warranty obligated the landlord to maintain the premises in habitable condition
throughout the lease.117 The court further explained that most urban tenants
no longer had the ability or the means to repair defective conditions in
modern residential complexes.118 Complicated mechanical systems shared
by an entire building and the development of specialized expertise dealing
with those systems made repairs by the tenants unlikely and impracticable.119
Without the action of this court, squalid living conditions in the District
were likely to lead to further social unrest.120 Eventually legislatures followed
the example of the judiciary and adopted versions of the Uniform
Residential Landlord/Tenant Act.121

v. Marrable (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 693, 694; 11 M. & W. 6, 7–9 (creating an exception for a
short-term furnished lease).
113. Even if the residence were destroyed, the tenant would still owe the rent because the
traditional common law courts used the independent covenant model. SINGER, PROPERTY,
supra note 21, at 477–78.
114. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
115. Id. at 1073; see Chused, supra note 110, at 123, 127–35 (providing background on
the Javins dispute).
116. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072–74.
117. Id. at 1082.
118. Id. at 1078–79.
119. Id. at 1074, 1077–79.
120. See Chused, supra note 110, at 135 (discussing the social unrest in Washington,
D.C. around the time of the litigation).
121. See Christopher Wm. Sullivan, Note, Forgotten Lessons from the Common Law,
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Holdover Tenant, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1287, 1311–12 (2006). In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission approved a revised
version. See REVISED UNIF. RESIDENT LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2015).
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A second example of the distribution function in operation involves the
use of common law notions of equity and fairness to promote equal access
to basic public services. Those principles include theories treating some
services provided by private parties as “governmental in nature” because
of the significance of the services to the public in general.122 The services
could concern an essential government function, become essential because of
a special privilege conferred by government on a private party—for example,
the power of eminent domain—or involve a type of monopoly power due
to the nature of the service.123 The “public” nature of the activity being
conducted by the private party, in other words, had provided “unique
privileges and liberties” to the private party that became the source of a
duty to serve the public equally.124 Over hundreds of years, English and
American courts have used common law concepts like “property clothed
with a public interest” to address serious problems arising from the provision
of government-type services by private companies.125 The courts applied
the concepts, in various forms, to rates charged for essential goods like grain,
access to facilities such as inns and mills, modes of transportation such as
toll roads and railroads, and the provision of basics needed for survival
like drinking water.126
Property’s operating principles also provide ways to check problems
caused by property transactions and uses. The numerus clausus concept
limits the choice of property forms available to parties, working in the
shadows to control options and thus reduce information costs.127 Another
principle, ratione soli, gives landowners the first option to capture wild
animals or use other natural resources on their land.128 Yet another, the
seemingly obscure ad coelum doctrine, gives the right to use the subsurface
and the air space above a tract to the landowner.129 For a long time, the
doctrine described landowners’ rights in absolute terms, declaring their
rights as extending up to the heavens and down to the depths of the Earth.130
More recently, as technological advances have made new uses of the air
and underground possible, courts have reexamined the doctrine’s definition

122. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 146–48, 200–08 (1986).
123. See id. at 145–51, 199–221 (discussing when property became “clothed with
a public interest”).
124. Id. at 201.
125. Id. at 120–21, 145–48, 200–03, 206, 224–25.
126. Id. at 145–48, 200–07.
127. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
128. See Goodard v. Winchell, 52 N.W. 1124, 1124–25 (Iowa 1892).
129. See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936).
130. See id.; Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929).
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of landowners’ rights.131 The invention of the airplane, for instance, led
to the recognition that flight might not occur at all under the absolutist
view if the consent of every landowner involved in a flight route were
required.132 The landowners’ air rights under the ad coelum doctrine thus
were redefined in more practical terms to involve the right to the airspace
that is connected to the enjoyment of the land, which at least includes the
airspace that the landowner is occupying and using.133 Some courts have
similarly reexamined the doctrine for subsurface rights.134 New subsurface
uses like hydraulic fracking and Elon Musk’s tunnel project in Los Angeles
may further test the limits of the doctrine’s applicability to subsurface rights.135
Other operating principles help to resolve disputes, often with remarkable
clarity and simplicity. Nemo dat, or the good title rule, promotes the in
rem character of property rights, allowing owners or possessors to inject
their property into the stream of commerce without losing their rights by
limiting the interests of subsequent transferees to the rights of their
transferor.136 Under the common law good title rule, a seller or transferor
generally cannot transfer a greater interest than he or she has.137 Another
concept, relativity of title, often works in concert with the good title rule
to provide a simple but powerful dispute resolution principle that protects
the interests of the prior peaceful possessor of tangible property against a
subsequent possessor, even if the prior possessor is not the true owner.138
The interests of the finder, for example, prevail over the interests of
the subsequent possessor who is not the true owner or who does not claim
131. See Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757.
132. See id. at 758.
133. Id. at 757–58.
134. Compare Edwards, 24 S.W.2d at 620–21 (majority opinion), with id. at 621–22
(Logan, J., dissenting).
135. See Alana Semuels, When Elon Musk Tunnels Under Your Home, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/los-angeleselon-musk-tunnels-under-neighborhood/575725/ [https://perma.cc/3RM7-EQEH]; see also
C HRISTOPHER W RIGHT & D ANIEL N YBERG , C LIMATE C HANGE , C APITALISM , AND
CORPORATIONS 32 (2015) (describing fracking as an example of corporate “blindness” to
ecological disaster). For an example of the conflict created when fracking became viable
and homeowners did not own the mineral rights below their surface estate, see John Murawski,
Lack of Mineral Rights Puts Some Homebuyers in Legal Limbo, WINSTON-SALEM J.
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://journalnow.com/news/state/lack-of-mineral-rights-puts-somehomebuyers-in-legal-limbo/article_64a17c86-2d9a-11e2-8f9b-0019bb30f31a.html [https://
perma.cc/LV9F-NEUV].
136. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 81, at 882–83.
137. See id.
138. See SINGER, PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 825.
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through the true owner. Further, the subsequent possessor may not divert
attention away from his inferior claim by challenging the title of the prior
possessor.139 This concept takes a relational approach to defining property
rights, varying the result depending on the parties to the dispute and
promoting the importance of possession in the property system.
Even disputes involving interests in shared or unowned resources can
be governed by the relativity of title concept. Under the common law riparian
doctrine traditionally applicable in the water-rich East, shorefront landowners
have correlative rights in the adjacent waterway, entitling them to make
reasonable use of the waters subject to the same rights in other riparian
landowners.140 Upstream riparians thus have the first opportunity to conduct
a reasonable but not unlimited use.141 When the resources involve intangible
intellectual property, the rights of a creator who cannot fully protect her
creation because of the nature of her business or activity may still receive
some protection against commercial exploitation by competitor third parties,
but not generally against the public.142 In International News Service v.
Associated Press, the Court stressed that the key perspective in resolving
the dispute before it was not the rights of the claimant as against the public,
but rather the rights of the claimant as against the defendant, a competitor
in the business of gathering the news.143
Anti-fragmentation devices are also built into property’s operating rules
to help prevent excessive segmentation.144 Over hundreds of years, English
and American property regimes have developed tools to deal with physical
and conceptual fragmentation. The Statute Quia Emptores, for example,
was adopted to stop subinfeudation of feudal estates in land, while intestate
succession laws clarified the passage of property upon the death of the
owner.145 The common law estates of dower and curtesy and their statutory
replacements, the forced share provisions, save a portion of a decedent’s
estate for the surviving spouse.146 Enclosure laws balance the relationship
139. See Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664; 1 Strange 505, 505;
Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636, 637 (Minn. 1892).
140. See Robert H. Abrams, Riparian Right, BRITANNICA (Sept. 6, 2007), https://
www.britannica.com/topic/riparian-right [https://perma.cc/498B-X7LK].
141. Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95,
171 (1985).
142. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918).
143. Id. at 239 (“The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and
defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves.”).
144. Heller, supra note 25, at 1169.
145. See id. at 1171.
146. See id. at 1170–71; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 400 (3d
ed. 1993).
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of landowners in rural areas with members of the community engaged in
activities like hunting and grazing that could benefit from open lands.147
The laws, for example, indicate whether land enclosure is based on a fencingin or fencing-out default rule.148 Boundary related legal principles also
define the appropriate scale of boundedness in various contexts ranging
from minimum lot sizes for residential development to real estate taxation
of individual tracts and application of the unitary tract concept as a way
to gauge community understandings about tract ownership in various legal
contexts.149 Other rules, like the Rule against Perpetuities and the policy
against dead hand control, deal with temporal fragmentation,150 while
organizations recognized under common interest community laws address
problems of social fragmentation by linking lot owners having shared
property interests.151
Property’s structure and operating principles thus provide ways to check
some of the problems caused by property transactions and use. These
checks, however, will not be enough—without change—to deal with
property’s problem of extremes. The type of constraints needed will depend
on the reasons for the property system’s failure to control the development
of extremes.

147. The concept of common lands, for example, protected the public’s interests in
hunting, fishing, and fowling in some of the original colonies. See, e.g., LYNDA LEE BUTLER &
MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW 162–88 (1988) (discussing the
development of the commons concept in England, colonial Virginia, and the Commonwealth of
Virginia). Some courts also protected customs that allowed hunters to follow game onto
unenclosed rural lands. See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 227–28 (Md.
1936) (discussing the relative rights of landowners and fox hunters); M’Conico v.
Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818) (discussing the right to hunt on unenclosed
land).
148. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 81, at 370–73.
149. See Heller, supra note 25, at 1173. The unitary tract concept, for example, is
important in deciding the extent to which the doctrine of constructive adverse possession
applies to lands under common ownership when a portion is occupied by an adverse possessor.
See 9 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.01–.02 (2020); see also
SPRANKLING, supra note 45, at 455, 460–61. The concept is also important to defining
riparian land. Butler, supra note 141, at 122–23.
150. See Heller, supra note 25, at 1178–81.
151. See David C. Drewes, Note, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 314, 315–16 (2001).
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IV. REORDERING FOR SYSTEM INTEGRITY
Dealing with property’s problem of extremes will require fundamental
reforms to property’s norm-based assumptions and incentive structure.
Each problem of extremes has its own causal connection with the property
system that will shape the nature of change. All three are fueled by the
freeriding incentives of the economic theory of property rights controlling
western-style property systems. When the problem involves the type of
catastrophic environmental harm that could result from climate change,
the freeriding is global in nature and, in the view of the 2018 Nobel Prize
winning economist William Nordhaus, the “fundamental reason for the
lack of progress” in combatting climate change.152 To compound the problem,
“the potential impacts of extreme events—what are known as ‘tail events’ . . .
[may be] so surprising, so outside everyday observations, that we are
unprepared to deal with them.”153 That is, the tail events “come from the
far tail, or most unlikely part, of a probability distribution.”154 Solving extreme
problems that undermine the stability of political, social, and biophysical
systems requires a reexamination and reframing of the norms and principles
of the institution of property—one of our core ordering and management
systems.155
One important reordering must involve strengthening norms of cooperation
to overcome or constrain predatory instincts encouraged by the neoliberal
economic theory of property. The destructiveness furthered by malicious
or bad faith use of property should not be part of the rights of property
owners. No one should have the right to seriously harm or endanger
the well-being of the whole or the integrity of common or shared systems.
One way to restrain destructive tendencies is to stop equating net individual
welfare with net social welfare. This step is especially necessary when the
integrity of the whole is harmed by the use of a part—such as by promoting
coal mining when less harmful energy sources exist—or when the property
owner is freeriding off shared or common resources without accounting for
substantial costs to those resources—e.g., the Central Park skyscrapers.
152. William D. Nordhaus, A New Solution: The Climate Club, N.Y. REV. (June 4,
2015), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/new-solution-climate-club/ [https://perma.cc/
5LDZ-826N] (reviewing GERNOT WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, CLIMATE SHOCK:
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A HOTTER PLANET (2015)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Several scholars describe the reframing of moral values of governance systems as a
necessity and recognize climate change not only as a physical threat, but also as a threat to “the
legitimacy and stability of governance systems and actors.” Katrina Brown, W. Neil
Adger & Joshua E. Cinner, Moving Climate Change Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons,
54 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 61, 61 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0959378018313116?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/999B-QHLU].
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Because of changes in the legal, economic, and natural systems, it is important
to recognize that the conditions necessary for effective operation of Adam
Smith’s invisible hand have been undermined.156 Thus, in determining
whether a property owner’s proposed use promotes net social welfare, the
decision-making process now should include meaningful consideration of
third party and public interests. Becoming more outward-regarding when
common or shared resources are involved would, in turn, lead to stronger
norms of cooperation.
Another way to strengthen norms of cooperation is to eliminate
presumptions or preferences in favor of one private property owner when
shared or common resources are involved and other property interests in
the same or connected resources could be damaged or destroyed. For example,
although a legal presumption or rule may have shaped the expectations of
the favored coal mine owner in Mahon and other similar cases, the owners
of affected surface estates would not necessarily foresee use of the mines
to the point of destroying the surface estate,157 especially not when the
original sale of the surface land occurred long before technological advances
allowed more extensive mining. Instead, the law should encourage the
traditionally preferred property owner to pursue alternative arrangements
that would accommodate both users or at least minimize harm and loss of
investment. A less permanent property interest in the surface land—for
example, a lease for a fixed term with the term set by the party with the
superior information about plans for future mining—would discourage
significant and potentially wasted investment in the surface estate.
The Central Park building projects exemplify all too clearly how social
utility can differ from individual utility.158 To the developer, the project
is all about profiting from sales—about selling as many luxury condominium
units as allowed under sound engineering principles and under the law.
An unrestricted view of Central Park significantly increases the price of a
luxury unit, especially when the unit is on one of the top floors.159 To the
public, however, the project is not about providing expensive housing for
the ultra rich but rather about harming a treasured public resource that is
156. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text (discussing some of those changed
conditions).
157. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
159. See Caroline Biggs, Rooms with a View (and How Much You’ll Pay for Them), N.Y.
TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/realestate/rooms-witha-view-and-how-much-youll-pay-for-them.html [https://perma.cc/39LN-XGXV].

97

BUTLER_58-1_POST BUTLER PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/22/2021 3:16 PM

important to the well-being of millions of people and that is a substantial
draw for tourism and other economic activities.160 Thus, when evaluating
the utility of public and private interests, the comparison should not simply
weigh the considerable revenues generated by sales of the condominiums
with the difficult-to-measure value of the park to the public. Rather it
should also consider the benefits to end users—the buyers of the units versus
the millions of people who would be burdened by significant harm to the
Park.
A second important reform must address property’s problem of scale—
that is, the limited perspectives taken by property owners in making decisions
about their property. Part of the problem is the quantitative methodologies
used to evaluate individual and social welfare. Besides assuming that
preferences and values can be measured quantitatively and that good data
can be found, these tools underestimate or overlook interests not easily
measured in economic terms. As Laurence Tribe explained years ago:
“[Q]uantitative decision-making techniques . . . reduce[] entire problems
to terms that misstate their underlying structure, typically collapsing into
the task of maximizing some simple quantity an enterprise whose ordering
principle is not one of maximization at all.”161 Doug Kysar critiques the
main quantitative tool, cost-benefit analysis, in evaluating climate change
policymaking and concludes that it is “an unacceptably crude device for
guiding policy choices in the context of a massively complex and morally
imbued problem such as global climate change.”162 Consider, by way of
comparison, the decision-making process used by numerous climate scientists
in preparing the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. A much more complex process, it includes evaluating relevant
scientific studies, formulating possible conclusions, running multiple modeling
scenarios to test those conclusions, and then using a consensus approach
not only in making decisions but also in assessing the wording of the
conclusions and the level of confidence to be attached to the conclusions.163
Although it would be unreasonable to expect ordinary property owners to

160. See McKnight, supra note 83.
161. Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.
66, 97 (1972).
162. Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 555, 558 (2004).
163. See, e.g., Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC
Starts Meeting to Finalize Working Group II Report (Mar. 25, 2014), https://archive.
ipcc.ch/pdf/press/140325_WGII_press_release.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG9N-3KJ4] (discussing
the process used); LISA V. ALEXANDER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/
2018/02/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR8B-8Q83] (discussing the models
and evidence, with quantitative and qualitative assessments).
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follow such a process, a reframing of underlying property norms and
principles would guide property owners to include stronger norms of
cooperation and to recognize outward-regarding interests.
Another reform would expand the reach of the norm of preservation
used in managing certain property arrangements involving interests divided
over time to situations involving conflicting interests in shared resources
or common systems. In the area of landlord/tenant law, for example, the
doctrine of waste prevents a tenant from harming the long-term interests
of the landlord.164 Under the doctrine the tenant is obligated to return the
premises to the landlord basically in the same condition, reasonable wear
and tear excepted.165 Life estate holders similarly owe a duty not to
commit waste to the future interest holder, and even improvements to the
estate causing a substantial change could result in liability.166 Surely a duty
to preserve critical biophysical resources and ecosystem services to the
degree needed to sustain life and protect the integrity of the whole for present
and future generations would make as much sense. If traditional property
law could realize the importance of protecting property rights from too
much fragmentation, then a modern property system should be able to
draw upon its evolutionary tools to address problems of excess threatening
the integrity of the Earth system as well as the social and ecological systems
dependent on it.
V. CONCLUSION
The structure and operating principles of property are subtle—so subtle
that property is often viewed primarily as a way to allocate interests in
resources and promote efficiency through marketplace transactions. Yet
property also performs important distribution and management functions
that address relational interests not only among private parties but also
between property owners and their government. Property, in other words,
plays an important role in defining the power relationship between individual
property owners and their government, as well as between property owners
and members of society. The paradox of property is that it is both a
fundamental individual right and a fundamental part of our social systems,
164. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 658 (2006).
165. See Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6, 14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929).
166. See id.; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738, 741 (Wis. 1899); see also
Purdy, supra note 164, at 658.
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broadly defined. It is time to resolve that paradox by recognizing property’s
dependence on the Earth system as well as property’s role in defining our
relationship with economic and political systems. The key to taking this
step is to view property as a system with a complex infrastructure and
embedded norms and operating principles that fail to reflect current
biophysical and social conditions.
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